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Abstract: T h s  study deals with the problem of prioritization of Information Security Controls where most 
organizatiom aim to address andmanage them effectively. Current information security analysis methods lack 
a quantitative approach and mostly depend on subjective judgments of information security experk. Although, 
exped opiniom assist organizatiom in measuring the effectiveness of security controls, the subjective 
judgments may yield dfferent results. Hence, a more objective approach that can be quantified is an alternative. 
This study implements multiple attribute decision-making concepts for prioritizing and selecting security 
controls using Hierarchcal Adaptive Weighting (HAW) and Simple Adaptive Weighting (SAW). The results 
of these analysis methods are repoded and compared. 
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INTRODUCTION of the framework by applying quantitative or qualitative 
modeling techniques (Lauesen and Younessi, 1998). 
The focus of information security is to protect Risk assessment research was expanded in the last 
organizatiom from attacks and to provide confidentiality, few years, both in the academic and commercial sectors 
integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudation but the key area of IT risk assessment is yet to receive 
(CIAA) of their information assets (Wheeler, 2011). A enough attention (Breier and Hudec, 2011). Several risk 
continued defense techmque against threats on these analysis methodologies and models were developed to 
assets can be acheved through control assessment and solve the issues and challenges of these methods 
analysis methods. Many organizatiom have seenthese as (Kiesling et al., 2012). However, quantitative techniques 
a priority and they have becoming increasingly i m p o w t  and methods that consider decision-making criteria and 
to minimize the potential risks (Feng and Li, 201 1 ; cost effective analysis are still lacking. 
Lv et al., 2011). Early work in this area was proposed by (Singh and 
Information security experk urge organizations to Lilja, 2009), where by a statistical design of experiments 
conduct information security risk assessment to presenre based on security architecture was presented. The 
the CIAA of the assets and to help them meet business authors generated the security control configuration 
objectives (Gordon and Loeb, 2006). Several approaches change recommendations based on the cost criteria that 
are available on the process aspects of risk management are impodant to the enterprise and the changing nature of 
covering from standards organizatiom, academic groups, threats. A statistical model scored the critical controls 
to industry bodies. These approaches include IS027005 based on the simple sum of ranks of the cost criteria, 
(ISO/IEC, 2008), NIST SP 800-30 (Stonebnmer et al., 2032), wherein an inaccurate evaluation can be created. 
OCTAVE (Alberk et al., 2003), Information Risk The major contribution of (Lv et al., 2011) is a 
Analysis Methodology (IRAM) (IRAM, 2010; IRAM, control-ranking model that considers multiple criteria 
2011), CRAMM (Veiga andEloff, 2007) and expression analysis and the interests of different decision makers in 
of needs and identification of security objectives (EBIOS) implementing a security control plan. However, the 
(EBIOS, 201 0). These approaches provide a process authors ignored the feature of the control ranking problem 
framework and allow organizatiom to define their analysis as a group decision problem where subjective and 
process in selecting and prioritizing security controls objective judgment must be available to provide better 
(Smgh, 2009). Most of these frameworks are also based on ranking to controls. The Cyber Investment Analysis 
qualitative analysis and require real expeds to follow the Method was proposed by Llanso (2012). A data-driven 
complicated steps for selecting the best and critical approach for selecting and prioritizing security controls 
controls (Andersen, 2009; Hubbard, 2009). T h s  situation provides a frame work to rank the security controls. The 
has encouraged researchers to improve security decisions framework ranks the security controls based on the data 
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set extracted from previous experiments and control 
effectiveness scoring. The methodology mainly focuses 
on prioritizing the controls based on the control 
effectiveness score. In setting the security controls, 
however, weighting is computed based on subject matter 
e x p e a  who used their knowledge of security control 
capabilities. These weights are based on exped 
obsenrations about the effectiveness of controls. Clear 
classification of the data set and the analysis and 
estimation is not available. 
MULTI ATTRIBUTE DECISION MAKING 
Multiple criteria decision making (MADM) refers to 
decision-making in the presence of multiple, confusing or 
conflictq criteria. Multiple criteria decision problems are 
common (Hwang and Yoon, 1981; Zavadskas et al., 2009). 
MADM methods are classified into three 2 types based 
on the type of information that the decision maker 
provides: no information, information on attributes and 
information on alternatives (Hwang and Yoon, 1981; 
Yoon and Hwang, 1995; Rahraman and Ceb, 2009). T h s  
study ocuses on the type of information where the 
decision maker provides information on the attribute. 
Hierarchcal Adaptive Weighting (HAW) and Simple 
Ah~ptive Weight~ng (SAW) are some of the major classes 
of the information on attributes methods of MADM. 
Therefore HAW and SAW are selected and applied in h s  
study. Multiple attribute decision-making ranking defines 
fundamental terms such as decision matrix, the Evaluation 
Matrix (EM), the alternatives and the criteria. 
The evaluation matrix comisting of alternatives m 
and n criteria need to be created, with the intersection 
of each alternative and criteria given as x ,  we therefore 
have a (q,)m.n: 
where A,, A,, . . ,  4, are possible altematives among whch 
decision makers have to choose ( i e ,  techmcal security 
controls), C,, C , , ,  C, are criteria with which alternative 
performance are measured ( i e ,  vulnerabilities, threats, 
validvulnerabilities, severity, cost remediation effod) and 
finally, q, is the rating of alternative A, with respect to 
criterion C, and W, is the weight of criterion C, ( i e ,  threats 
weight severity weight and cost remediation weight). A 
cedain processes need to be done to rank the altematives 
such as normalization, maximization indicator, adding the 
weights and other processes depend on the method. 
Hierarchical adaptive weighting (HAW method) 
Rescoring: In the hierarchcal addtive weighting method 
(HAW) each criterion value interprets q, the ratio of as 
the sub-score of the alternative ith with regards to the jth 
criterion, whch is defined as: 
Equatiorl 1 is used when there is benefit criteria, whle 
Eq. 2 used when there is cost criteria. This will result the 
new matrix K: 
Ranking the alternatives based on the mission 
effectiveness: Assume the set of weights 4 from the 
decision maker is accommodated to compute the vector 
for the hierarchcal mission effectiveness h i s  given by: 
where, (wT) is the trampose of vector (w) 
Ranking the alternative according to the descending 
value of the alternatives: The set of alternative A, can 
now be ranked according to the descendmg order of the 
altematives, where, the highest value the better 
performance. 
Simple adaptive weighting (S'4W method) 
Linear scale transformation: In this process, the value of 
the criterion is divided by the maximum value of the 
criterion for all altematives, therefore: 
Equation 4 is used when there is benefit criteria, 
whle E q  5 used when there is cost criteria. Ths  will result 
the new matrix R: 
[h I,, ~~ 1 ~ ~ 1  RESULTS 
Construct the weighted transformed decision matrix: In 
this process, a set of weights w = w,, w,, w , , ,  w, , . ,  w,, 
from the decision maker is accommodated to the 
tramformed decision matrix; the resulted matrix can be 
calculated by multiplying each column from normalized 
decision matrix (R) with its associated weight w,. As 
mentioned before the set of the weights is equal to 1, this 
process will result a new matrix V where, V is as shown 
below: 
Construct the weighted average value for the 
alternatives: In t h ~ s  process, the summation of the new 
values that resulted from the previous step is calculated 
as: 
Ranking the alternative according to the descending 
value of the alternatives: The set of the alternative A, can 
now be ranked according to the descendmg order of the 
alternatives, where, the highest value the better 
performance. 
This section presents the results obtained from the 
prior experiments conducted in a small-medum enterprise, 
where indifferent t e c h c a l  security controls are 
implemented. A small and medium enterprise in Malaysia 
was selected. This enternrise was an internet securitv 
consulting company that had less than 250 employees. 
Technical controls are defined as the safeguards built into 
the hardware and the computer software such as firewalls, 
routers, databases and sewers. More than 50 experiments 
were conducted in a real-time network. The vulnerabilities 
among these controls were first identified using different 
vulnerability assessment tools such as Nessus, Nmap, 
Dumpsec, Kismet and Acunetix. The analyzed data were 
obtained kom the vulnerability assessment using dfferent 
penetration testing tools such as Metasploif Airsnort 
and Nstealth. The data were validated to obtain accurate 
result estimation prior to the data analysis. A group 
analysis panel was conducted with different experts to 
~ - 
estimate the severity and cost of the remediation effort. 
Security controls were rated on a scale of 1 (critical risk) 
to 18 (low risk). Finally, the obtainedresults were analyzed 
using the HAW and SAW methods to prioritize the 
feedback and data of the experts as shown in Table 1 
and 2. The controls for each criterion shown in Table 1 
were ranked using the HAW and SAW methods based on 
the high risk of the control (1 being the most critical and 
18 being the least critical). The ranks for each criterion 
were then determined again using the HAW method to 
determine an overall rank. The top eight critical risks of 
the information security controls to the organization were 
selected. A comparison of the results in Table 1 and 2 
reflected in Table 3. 
Table 1: Resulti tanking summiuy of HAW method 
Technical security Known Valid Remediation 
controls vulnerabilities vulnerabilities Attack class Severity effort level Ranking 
Router 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Firewall 17 16 16 18 13 18 
Web application 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Web s m e r  2 3 4 4 3 3 
DHCP sewer 9 11 6 14 9 8 
Active directny 11 9 7 13 12 10 
CCTV s m e r  7 6 9 9 6 6 
File s m e r  14 12 12 11 10 12 
Antivirus s m e r  10 8 13 12 15 11 
Database 4 7 10 10 8 7 
Activemail s m e r  8 10 14 5 14 9 
Windows update s m e r  15 15 15 17 16 17 
VMware ESX s m e r  5 5 5 3 4 4 
Passive mail sewer 6 4 3 8 5 5 
Wireless AP 15 17 17 6 17 15 
Email gateway 18 18 18 7 18 16 
DNS 12 13 8 15 11 14 
Development s m e r  13 14 11 16 7 13 
Table 2: Resulti mking summiuy of SAW method 
Technical Known Valid 
security conh-ols vulnerabilities vulnerabilities 
Router 3 2 
Firewall 17 16 
Web application 1 1 
Web s m e r  2 3 
DHCP sewer 9 11 
Active directny 11 9 
CCTV s m e r  7 6 
File s m e r  14 12 
Antivims s m e r  10 8 
Database 4 7 
Activemail s m e r  8 10 
Windows update s m e r  15 15 
VMware ESX s m e r  5 5 
Passive mail sewer 6 4 
Wireless AP 16 17 
Email gateway 18 18 
DNS 12 13 
Development s m e r  13 14 
Table 3: Comparison of HAW and SAW results 
Technical security Technical security 
conh-01s (HAW conh-ols (SAW) 
Web application Web application 
Router Router 
Web s m e r  Web s m e r  
VMware ESX s m e r  VMware ESX s m e r  
Passive mail s m e r  Passive mail s m e r  
CCTV s m e r  CCTV s m e r  
Database Database 
DHCP sewer DHCP sewer 
Activemail s m e r  Active mail s m e r  
Active directny Active directny 
Antivims s m e r  Antivims s m e r  
File s m e r  File s m e r  
Development s m e r  DNS 
DNS Development s m e r  
Wireless AP Wireless AP 
Email gateway Firewall 
Windows update s m e r  Email gateway 
Firewall Windows update s m e r  
DISCUSSION 
Inaccurate selection and evaluation of information 
securitv controls can create an unclear view of 
organizational risk during the risk assessment exercise. 
The information security controls prioritization methods 
enable decision makers to formulate accurate decisions 
concerning the critical controls and threats that should be 
considered. The list of critical security controls in 
Table 1 shows that web application is the most impodant 
security control that should be addressed followed by 
router, web sewer, VMware ESX sewer, passive mail 
server, CCTV sewer, database and DHCP sewer. These 
controls were evaluated based on the number of known 
vulnerabilities and based on different evaluation criteria, 
such as severity and cost remedation effod level. Critical 
controls were prioritized and selected using the SAW 
method as well, as shown in Table 2. The list of critical 
security controls in Table 2 shows that web application is 
Remediation 
Attack class Severity effort level Ranking 
2 2 3 2 
Fig. 1 : Technical security controls ranking 
the most vulnerable security control, followed by router, 
web sewer and VMware ESX sewer. A comparison of the 
results in Table 1 and 2 shows that the lists of these 
controls are slightly dfferent as reflected in Table 3. 
Table 3 shows that the two most significant controls of 
organization are the firewall and wireless AP for both 
methods. T h s  result proves that the firewall, e-mail 
gateway sewer and Windows update sewer are the most 
effective controls in preventing attacks. Figure 1 shows 
the comparison ratio of HAW and SAW for technical 
security controls ranked from bottom to top. 
CONCLUSION 
Risk analysis is the fundamental basis of risk 
management and is the most i m p o w t  component in the 
field of risk assessment. Information security experts in 
organizatiom conduct risk analysis through dfferent 
phases to determine the levels of potential threats and the 
related risks to the assets of an organization. The current 
frameworks and methodologies are complex and full of 
uncertainty whch can affect their effectiveness. The gap 
has encouraged many studies to improve the issues and 
challenges. 
This study proposed MADM methods specifically 
HAW and SAW to enhance the information security 
control selection and prioritization. The solution proposed 
in h s  study improved the risk assessment process by 
providng a dynamic analysis method that will assist 
organizatiom to evaluate the ISC accurately whle 
comidering the weight of each attribute or evaluation 
criterion. It will also assist the organization covering and 
selecting the effectiveness performance of the security 
controls. 
The data gathered in this study was obtained using 
different multi-decision attribute making methods. The 
results of this study and those of other methods should 
also be examined to determine the most effective method. 
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